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Is Devolution Strengthening or Weakening the UK?
John Curtice and Ben Seyd*
The recent creation of devolved assemblies in each of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland constitutes the most radical change in the government of the 
United Kingdom since 1922, when the Irish Republic left the Union and
Northern Ireland was given its own parliament. For some, their creation will
demonstrate the ability of the Union to accommodate the diversity of aspirations
and identities that exist within it, and thereby give it a new strength. For others, 
devolution is the thin end of a wedge (or, alternatively, a stepping stone) that 
will eventually drive the component territories of the United Kingdom –
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – apart. And, whichever
argument is correct, the introduction of devolution is certainly an attempt to
respond to apparent dissatisfaction with and questioning of the Union among
many people living outside of England.
Whether devolution does eventually strengthen or weaken the Union will 
ultimately be determined in the court of public opinion. To strengthen it, the 
new devolved bodies need to be seen as a success by the people they seek to 
serve and people’s sense of commitment to a sense of Britishness needs to be
enhanced, as well as support for keeping Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
within the UK increased. If the devolved bodies are seen as a failure, or if they 
come to encourage a separate sense of identity and a taste for national
independence, or, indeed, if they create a feeling of resentment in England, then
the Union will undoubtedly be weakened.
Of all the recent moves towards devolution, none appears to be more 
momentous for the future of the Union than the creation of a separate Scottish 
Parliament in Edinburgh. After all, Northern Ireland has experienced devolution
before and the Welsh National Assembly lacks any primary legislative powers.
But in Scotland,  the second largest component of the United Kingdom, a 
parliament has been created that can pass laws across a wide range of
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responsibilities including health, education and criminal justice. In short, what 
for nearly 300 years had been considered to the best way of managing the Union
between Scotland and England – a single imperial parliament – has simply been
overturned.
So, monitoring how people in England  and Scotland are reacting to the 
experience of devolution is essential in forming any assessment of whether this 
radical constitutional change is delivering its objectives. This is the task that this
chapter sets out to tackle. It examines how people both in England and in
Scotland have reacted to the initial experience of devolution. What impact if
any has it had so far on their national identity and commitment to the Union? 
What do Scots make of their new devolved institutions? And how has England
reacted to the new privileges granted to its neighbour? Is there any hint of an
‘English backlash’ – for example, greater demand for similar privileges for
England?
To address these questions, we have access not only to the British Social 
Attitudes survey, but also to the Scottish Social Attitudes survey. This was 
conducted by the National Centre for Social Research alongside its British 
counterpart and includes many identical or functionally equivalent questions
(Curtice  et al., 2001, forthcoming). The Scottish Social Attitudes survey
interviewed no less than 1,663 respondents in Scotland in 2000, thereby giving 
us a far more accurate and comprehensive picture of opinion north of the border
than could be obtained from the 325 people interviewed in Scotland by the
British Social Attitudes survey. In addition both the British and the Scottish
survey repeated key questions that had been asked on previous surveys in
England and Scotland, including the first Scottish Social Attitudes survey in
1999 (Paterson et al., 2001).
Evaluations of devolution
We begin by asking what people in Scotland and in England have made of 
devolution so far. If devolution is contributing to a strengthening of the Union,
we would anticipate that people would believe that creating the Scottish
Parliament and the Welsh National Assembly has improved the way that Britain
as a whole is governed. And certainly, so far as the Scottish Parliament is
concerned, as the next table shows, over three times as many people in Scotland
believe that its creation has improved the way that Britain is governed, as think
that it has made things worse.
However, even in Scotland, a plurality believes that creating the Scottish 
Parliament has made no difference  to the way that Britain is governed. 
Meanwhile, in England, those who think either Scottish or Welsh devolution 
has improved matters only just outnumber those who think it has made them
worse, while a majority think it has made no difference. True, there is little sign
of any ‘English backlash’, but at the same time, even in Scotland, many people 
are apparently not  convinced that their new parliament has made much
difference
Table 1 Perceptions of devolution, in England and Scotland
The way Britain as a whole is
governed has been … ... improved,  no difference,  made worse
England
by creating Scottish Parliament % 18 54 13
by creating Welsh Assembly % 15 57 12
Base: 1928
Scotland
by creating Scottish Parliament % 35 44 10
by creating Welsh Assembly % 18 46 4
Base: 1663
This conclusion is reinforced by other evidence from our Scottish surveys. At
the time of the first Scottish election in 1999, we asked respondents whether the
Scottish Parliament or the UK government at Westminster would come to have 
most influence over the way Scotland was run. About the same number of
people (41 per cent) thought that the Scottish Parliament would have most 
influence as thought the UK government at Westminster would (39 per cent). 
But after their initial experience of devolution, no less than two-thirds of Scots
now feel that the UK government has most influence in Scotland, while only
one in eight give that accolade to the Scottish Parliament. Moreover, as the next
table shows, whereas people in Scotland had a highly optimistic view of what
the Scottish Parliament would achieve when they voted for it in  the 1997
referendum, their expectations have now come down to earth. Overall, no less
than 30 per cent think that the new parliament will not achieve any of the four
objectives specified in the next table. While such a decline in expectations was
perhaps inevitable, it does confirm the impression that many people in Scotland
now appear to be wondering whether their new parliament will improve the way 
they are governed after all (see also Surridge, 2001, forthcoming).
However, few Scots think that the new parliament will do any actual harm.
Even on the issue on which they are least optimistic about the new body’s
ability – improving Scotland’s economy – only 13 per cent think that having the
parliament is going to make things worse. Rather, on most issues, Scots now 
simply think their parliament will make no difference either way. But while it 
might appear from this evidence that devolution is so far doing little to
strengthen Scots’ commitment to the Union, equally predictions that it would
break it apart are not sustained either. At the time of the referendum, no less 
than 42 per cent thought that creating the Scottish Parliament would make it 
more likely that Scotland would eventually leave the UK, a figure that had
fallen to 37 per cent by the time of the first Scottish election, and is now 27 per
cent – just barely above the 25 per cent who now think the new parliament
makes it more likely that Scotland will remain in the Union.
Table 2 Expectations of the Scottish Parliament, in Scotland, 1997-2000
% saying Scottish parliament will 1997 1999 2000
Give Scotland a stronger voice in the UK








Increase standard of education in Scotland 71 56 43
Make Scotland’s economy better 64 43 36
Base 657 1482 1663
Source: 1997: Scottish Referendum Study.
Sources of conflict?
So far then, it appears that devolution has neither strengthened nor weakened
the Union. Some critics of devolution, however, have not been so much 
concerned about what the Scottish Parliament might or might not be able to
achieve for Scotland, but rather about the danger that it would generate conflict 
between Scotland and England (Dalyell, 1977). In particular, two potential
flashpoints were identified. The first was whether it would be possible to sustain
a situation where Scottish MPs at Westminster could vote on health and 
education in England, while their English colleagues no longer had any say on
such matters in Scotland (the so-called West Lothian question). Second, it was 
argued that the higher level of public spending per capita in Scotland would 
come under closer public scrutiny, once issues of public spending were no
longer settled in private around the UK Cabinet table but could be the subject of
contention between the two parliaments.
At first glance, it appears from the next table that critics of devolution were
correct in believing that the voting rights of English and Scottish MPs could
well be a source of tension. Almost two-thirds of people in England agree that
“now that Scotland has its own parliament, Scottish MPs should no longer be 
allowed to vote in the UK House of Commons on laws that only affect
England”. Yet, on closer examination, this issue is not clearly a source of
conflict, for over half of people in Scotland also agree with the proposition. 
While this  may be an issue that MPs themselves find difficult to resolve, 
especially those on the Labour benches on which most Scottish MPs currently 
sit, it is not one that seems likely to set the English and Scottish publics at odds
with each other. Indeed, although they are more reluctant than others to see 
Scottish MPs’ voting rights limited, even a majority of Labour identifiers north
and south of the border agree that this should happen.
Table 3 Relations between England and Scotland, in England and Scotland
England Scotland
Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed to vote on
English legislation % %
Strongly agree 18 14
Agree 46 39
Neither agree nor disagree 19 17
Disagree 8 19
Disagree strongly 1 4
Base 1695 1506
Compared with other parts of the UK, Scotland’s share 
of government spending is … % %
Much more than fair 8 2
Little more than fair 13 8
Pretty much fair 42 27
Little less than fair 10 35
Much less than fair 2 23
Whose economy benefits more from Scotland being part 
of the UK? % %
England’s 8 43
Scotland’s 37 16
About equal 39 36
Conflict between the Scots and the English is … % %
Very serious 4 10
Fairly serious 16 28
Not very serious 54 53
There is no conflict 21 9
Base 1928 1663
Equally, there is relatively little potential for disagreement between the two
publics over Scotland’s share of government spending. True, two in three Scots 
believe that Scotland gets less than its fair share. But only just over one in five 
people in England believe that Scotland gets more than its fair share. Indeed,
what is perhaps most striking about public opinion in England on this subject, is
the low salience that it has. No less than a quarter of people in England were
unable to express a view on it. Perhaps if politicians in England continue to
press this issue, public opinion will become less accepting of Scotland’s current
financial position. But, evidently, the attempts that have been made so far by 
those English politicians who do feel strongly about the subject, have failed to 
secure much of an echo among their constituents. Moreover, there is no 
evidence in our survey that antipathy towards Scotland’s share of public
expenditure is greater in the North of England, some of whose politicians have 
perhaps been the most critical of Scotland’s more generous provision.
So, neither the status of Scotland’s MPs nor its share of public spending seem
so far at least to be likely flashpoints between the two countries – at least so far
as their publics are concerned. Nor, indeed, do many people on either side of the
border regard themselves as in “very serious conflict” with each other. True,
only around one in five people in England and one in ten in Scotland believe
that there is no conflict between the Scots and the English. But, in both cases,
over half think that the conflict that does exist is “not very serious”. Such a view
is perhaps no more than a recognition of differences of tradition and history that
may, for example, be played out on the sporting field, but are also largely
confined to that arena.
But if Scottish devolution so far shows little sign of generating resentment 
among people in England and thus conflict between them and people in
Scotland, neither has it yet done much to persuade people in Scotland that they
get a fair deal out of the Union. We have already seen that two out of three 
Scots believe that they actually get less than their fair share of UK public
spending. Meanwhile, as the previous table showed, they are also inclined to
believe that England gets more out of the Union economically than Scotland
does – a view not shared in England. Although the proportion of Scots believing
that England benefited most declined from 48 per  cent at the time of the
referendum to 38 per cent on the occasion of the first election to the Scottish
Parliament (Paterson et al., 2001), it has, as we can see, now risen once more to
43 per cent. Once again it appears that while devolution has apparently done
little harm to the Union, it has not done it much good so far either.1
Independence for Scotland?
But, of course, the acid test of whether devolution is pulling the Union apart is 
whether or not there has been any increase in the proportion who believe that 
Scotland should become an independent country outside the United Kingdom. 
Arguably too, the apparent disappointment with the impact so far of the Scottish 
Parliament only really matters if it is undermining support for the devolution
project as a whole.
The next table suggests that neither of these possible developments have, in
fact, so far come to pass. Support for Scottish independence did rise in the
immediate wake of the referendum that voted in favour of creating the Scottish
Parliament. But, at 30 per cent, the proportion of people in Scotland who now 
favour being an independent country, either inside or outside the EU, is little 
different from the 28 per cent who took that view at the time of the 1997 general
election. It is certainly still a long way from comprising a majority. Similarly,
support in England for Scottish independence rose between 1997 and 1999 from
14 per cent to 24 per cent, but has since fallen back somewhat to 20 per cent. At
most, the creation of the Scottish Parliament has made it possible for a few 
more people in England to conceive of the possibility that her neighbour might 






Scotland should ... % % %
be independent, separate from UK and EU 6 8 8
be independent, separate from UK but part of EU
remain part of UK with its own elected Parliament 







remain part of the UK with its own elected Parliament 
which has no taxation powers 17 10 8
remain part of the UK without an elected parliament 23 13 17
Base 3150 2718 1928
Scotland
Scotland should ... % % % %
be independent, separate from UK and EU 8 9 10 11
be independent, separate from UK but part of EU
remain part of UK with its own elected Parliament 









which has no taxation powers 10 9 8 8
remain part of the UK without an elected parliament 18 17 10 12
Base 882 676 1482 1663
of ejecting Scotland from the Union. We should note, however, that only a third
(36 per cent) of people in England say that they would be sorry to see Scotland 
become independent and leave the UK. While only 7 per cent would be pleased,
a majority (55 per cent) would be neither pleased nor sorry. This suggests that
the amount of affective, rather than cognitive, support for the Union within
England should not be overstated.
The next table also shows that a majority of people both north and south of the
border continue to support the idea of a Scottish Parliament within the UK, with
most of them backing the model that currently exists of a parliament with
taxation powers. Indeed, in both England and Scotland such  opposition as 
existed to the idea of creating some form of Scottish legislature is even lower
now than it was at the time that Labour first came to power. In short, whatever
might be thought to be its limitations in practice, devolution continues to be, in 
the words of the former Labour leader John Smith, the “settled will of the
people”, not just in Scotland but in England, too.
Table 4 Constitutional preferences for Scotland, in England and Scotland,
1997-2000
remain part of the UK with its own elected Parliament
Source: May 1997: British/Scottish Election Study. Sept. 1997: Scottish Referendum
Study.
We should not, however, assume from this that there would not be popular
support for changing the details of the current devolution settlement. That at 
least appears to be the case so far as people in Scotland are concerned. We have
already noted that no less than two-thirds of people in Scotland believe that the 
UK government at Westminster has most influence over the way that Scotland 
is run, not the Scottish Parliament. And, for many people in Scotland, this is a 
potential source of dissatisfaction. For when asked who should have most 
influence over the way Scotland is run, only one in eight say that the UK
government should, while nearly three-quarters say it should be the Scottish 
Parliament. It will therefore come as no surprise that two in three Scots agree 
that the Scottish Parliament should have more powers, or indeed that this
proportion has increased by ten points since 1999.
But if people in Scotland want a more powerful parliament than the one that
they have seen on display so far, there is as yet little sign that people in England
are clamouring to share in the experience that Scotland now enjoys. True, as the
next table shows, there has been an eight point drop over the last year in the
proportion of people in England who believe that there is no need for any
constitutional change in England. But this has been matched by only a marginal
increase in support for either an English parliament or regional assemblies –
more people now simply say they do not know. Even after a year of seeing the 
Scottish Parliament in action, a majority of people in England were apparently 
still happy for decisions about their laws and public services to be made by the
UK government and parliament at Westminster. Less than one in five back the
idea of creating regional assemblies, the long-term policy aim of the current
Labour government. Indeed, ironically, it appears that people in Scotland are 
rather more in favour of the idea of English devolution than people in England 
are themselves!
As we have already suggested, the demands by politicians and campaigners for 
England to be treated more equitably have been greater in some regions than 
others. Undoubtedly the most vociferous campaigning has occurred in the North
East of England (Tomaney, 2000). Yet, while this is the one region where less 
than half of people want England to be governed as it is now, even there only 
one in four currently support the idea of a regional assembly. Meanwhile, in the
southern half of England support for regional assemblies stands at only around
one in six. At present, the current Labour government envisages that regional 
assemblies will be created where a region votes for one in a referendum.  It
appears that those who favour such assemblies still have much persuasion to do
before they can win any such referendums.
Table 5  Attitudes towards constitutional reform for England, in England and
Scotland, 1999 and 2000
1999 2000
England % % 
England should be governed as it is now, with laws made by
the UK parliament 62 54
Each region of England to have its own assembly that runs
services like health 15 18
England as whole to have its own new parliament with law-
making powers 18 19
Base 2718 1928
Scotland % 
England should be governed as it is now, with laws made by
the UK parliament 45
Each region of England to have its own assembly that runs
services like health 15




So far we have looked at recent trends in people’s constitutional preferences in 
England and Scotland. But public support for the Union has traditionally been
based on more than cognitive preference. It has also been supported by a sense 
of national identity, that is, a sense of feeling British. To feel British has not
necessarily meant that people could not feel English or Scottish as well (Heath 
and Kellas, 1998).  Nevertheless, British identity did provide a sense of 
attachment to the United Kingdom in which people in all parts of it could share.
Creating separate devolved institutions in parts of the United Kingdom might 
serve to emphasise the differences between them in people’s minds, and thus
result in an increasing tendency to feel English or Scottish, rather than British.
Indeed, previous research conducted at the time of the 1999 Scottish election
suggests that this was precisely what was happening both north and south of the
border, even before devolution was actually in place (Curtice and Heath, 2000;
Paterson et al., 2001).
We have two measures of national identity available to us, with which we can
assess what has happened during the early lifetime of devolution. The first is the
so-called Moreno scale, named after the political scientist who first used it in 
comparisons of  Scotland and Catalonia (Moreno, 1988). Recognising the
possibility that people may feel British as well as Scottish or English, it asks 
people to state the relative importance of these identities to them. The question
runs as follows in Scotland (and similarly in England by substituting ‘English’
for ‘Scottish’):
Some people think of themselves first as British. Others may
think of themselves first as Scottish. Which, if any, of the 
following describes how you see yourself?
Scottish, not British
More Scottish than British 
Equally Scottish and British 
More British than Scottish 
British, not Scottish
As the next table shows, the results obtained by this measure suggest that the 
increase in feeling English or Scottish observed after the first election to the 
Scottish Parliament has been maintained. One in three people in England now 
give priority to their Englishness over their Britishness, almost identical to the
proportion who did so in 1999, and up on the one in four who felt that way in
1997. Meanwhile, in Scotland, over  two-thirds now feel wholly or mostly 
Scottish, again the same as in 1999 (though with rather more of them now
feeling wholly Scottish), but up on the three in five who felt that way in 1992 or
1997.
Table 6 Moreno national identity, in England and Scotland, 1992-2000
1992 1997 1999 2000
England % % %
English not British 7 17 19
More English than British 17 15 14
Equally English and British 45 37 34
More British than English 14 11 14
British not English 9 14 12
Other 5 3 6
Base 3150 2718 2887
Scotland % % % %
Scottish not British 19 23 32 37
More Scottish than British 40 38 35 31
Equally Scottish and British 33 27 22 21
More British than Scottish 3 4 3 3
British not Scottish 3 4 4 4
Other 1 2 3 4
Base 957 882 1482 1663
Sources: 1992: Scottish Election Survey 1992. 1997: British/Scottish Election Surveys
1997.
1979 1992 1997 1999 2000
% % % %
31 34 44 41
63 59 44 47
2442 3150 2718 2887
% % % % %
57 72 72 77 80
39 25 20 17 13
661 957 882 1482 1663
Our second measure, which is shown in the next table, tells a similar story.
Here we asked people to choose which one identity best described the way they 
thought of themselves.2   In both England and Scotland we can see a decline in
feeling British and an increase in feeling English/Scottish between 1997 and
1999. And, in both cases, that increase has more or less been sustained in our 
most recent surveys. Moreover, we can also see that in 1979, when Scotland 
failed to back devolution with sufficient enthusiasm for it to be implemented,
three times as many people in Scotland felt British as do so now.









Sources: 1979: Scottish Election Survey 1979. 1992, 1997: British/Scottish Election
Surveys 1992 and 1997.
So, there appears to have been some undermining of the sense of Britishness in 
both England and Scotland in the period since people in both Scotland and
Wales decided to vote in favour of devolution.3 Moreover, in both countries it 
appears to be a decline that has occurred more or less evenly across all age
groups, social classes and religious denominations as well as among both sexes.
To that degree at least, devolution appears to have weakened the Union. 
However, we should bear in mind that Britishness also fell heavily in Scotland
during the period after 1979 when Scotland was denied devolution. So we
should be very wary indeed of claiming that the sense of Britishness would be
significantly stronger now had devolution not happened.
Still, the sense of Britishness is clearly weaker than it once was. And it is also
clearly much weaker in Scotland than it is in England. But what consequences
flow from these patterns depends at least in part on what difference feeling
Scottish, English or British makes to other social and political attitudes. If those
who feel English or Scottish are largely similar in their attitudes to those who
feel British, then changes and differences in national identity may have few
implications for the stability of the Union. It is to an examination of whether or
not that is true that we now turn.
National identity and social attitudes
Perhaps the most obvious area where we might expect national identity to make
a difference both in England and in Scotland is in respect of constitutional 
preferences. In the next table  we show attitudes towards some of the  key 
constitutional issues we examined earlier, broken down by a collapsed version
of Moreno national identity.4
We  find that, in Scotland, national identity does make a difference to 
constitutional preferences. Those who feel predominantly Scottish are not only 
(unsurprisingly)  more  likely  than  others  to  be  in  favour   of  Scottish 
independence, but they are also less likely to be opposed to devolution for 
England. They are also rather less likely to believe that Scottish MPs should not
vote on English laws.








% who favour Scottish independence 23 17 14
% who oppose English devolution 54 52 59
% who believe Scottish MPs should
not vote on English laws 69 63 66








% who favour Scottish independence 37 14 7
% who oppose English devolution 41 54 55
% who believe Scottish MPs should
not vote on English laws 52 50 66
Base 1108 350 121
In England, in contrast, the pattern is far more muted – if it exists at all. Those
who feel predominantly English are rather more likely to favour Scottish 
independence, but at nine points the gap between them and the predominantly
British is far less than the equivalent 30-point gap in Scotland. Meanwhile,
when it comes to English devolution,  there is barely any difference at all 
between the three categories of national identity in our table, let alone on
whether Scottish MPs should vote on English laws. In other words national
identity makes more difference to attitudes towards English devolution in
Scotland than it does in England itself!
The same conclusion also holds for attitudes towards Scotland’s share of 
government spending, who benefits most from the Union, and whether there is 
conflict between the Scots and the English. In each case, national identity makes
a difference to people’s views in Scotland but not in England. So while any 
further decline in Britishness in Scotland might pose some demands on the
Union, it is far from clear that any continued rise in Englishness in England
need result in any difficulty at all (Curtice and Heath, 2000).
This difference between England  and Scotland  in the apparent  impact of 
national identity on attitudes is not confined to constitutional preferences. It is 
also evident when it comes to attitudes towards the role of government and the 
extent of social inequality in society. In Scotland, those who are predominantly 
Scottish are more concerned about social inequality and more likely to see the
need for government activity to reduce it. In short, they can be characterised as 
more left-wing. Thus, for example, as we can see from the next table, over half 
of those who are predominantly Scottish believe that the government should
definitely be responsible for ensuring that everyone has a job, whereas only one
in three of the predominantly British take that view. In contrast in England, a 
person’s national identity makes little difference to their views on these issues.
Table 9 Attitudes to role of government and social inequality by national 
identity, in England and Scotland
England







definitely be responsible for 
ensuring everyone has a job
% who agree that the government 
should redistribute income from the 
better off to the less well off
% who agree that there is one law for
43 37 37
41 38 35
the rich and one law for the poor 70 63 65
Base 552 571 439
Scotland







definitely be responsible for 
ensuring everyone has a job
% who agree that the government 
should redistribute income from the 
better off to the less well off
% who agree that there is one law for
53 40 33
52 43 43
the rich and one law for the poor 70 60 44
Base 1005 317 109
Again, we find a different story north and south of the border if we look at 
attitudes towards Europe and ethnic minorities. We might expect those who 
adopt an apparently narrower English or Scottish identity, rather than a broader 
multinational British one, to be less keen on the development of an even larger
supranational unit such as the European Union, as well as being less tolerant of
ethnic minorities. However, in Scotland at least, as the next table shows, there is
no consistent evidence that this is the case. Indeed, if anything, those with a 
predominantly Scottish national identity are more favourably disposed towards
the European Union than those with a predominantly British identity. The 
nationalist movement in Scotland has long  aimed to promote a ‘civic
nationalism’ rather than an ethnically based one, with both membership of the
European Union and promotion of the rights of ethnic minorities in Scotland a 
key part of their platform. It appears that this has indeed helped to ensure that a 
Scottish national identity is not an exclusive one.
Table 10 Attitudes towards the European Union and ethnic minorities by 
national identity, in England and Scotland
England







EU or EU powers should be 
reduced
% who would vote not to join the Euro
63 55 60
in a referendum 70 67 65
% who say they are “very” or “a little”
racially prejudiced 33 24 27
% who think equal opportunities for
blacks and Asians have “gone too 
far” or “much too far”
48 28 36
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EU or EU powers should be 
reduced
% who would vote not to join the Euro
47 52 59
in a referendum 53 56 57
% who say they are “very” or “a little”
racially prejudiced 18 19 21
% who think equal opportunities for
blacks and Asians have “gone too 
far” or “much too far”
32 29 26
Base 1005 317 109
In England, in contrast, feeling English is somewhat associated both with less 
tolerance of ethnic minorities and with opposition to further European 
integration. In particular, nearly a half of those who feel predominantly English 
say that equal opportunities for blacks and Asians have gone “too far” compared
with only just over a third of the predominantly British. The relationship
between Englishness and opposition to Europe is less apparent in our table 
because opposition is, in fact, concentrated among those who feel “English, not 
British” rather than among those who are “more English than British” (see also 
Curtice and Heath, 2000). If we look, for example, at the views of the
exclusively English on the Euro, opposition is as high as 73 per cent.5
So we have seen that in Scotland national identity is clearly associated with 
constitutional preferences and also with  a more left-wing stance on policy
issues. In England, this is either less true or not true at all. Meanwhile there is 
no consistent evidence that Scottish national identity is particularly associated 
with a tendency to be less inclusive towards the outside world, whereas there is 
a hint at least that English national identity is. Evidently national identity has
different meanings and implications in the two countries.
There are at least two probably interrelated reasons as to why this is so. First, 
national identity has been politicised in Scotland, whereas it has not been in 
England. In England there is little or no relationship between national identity 
and the party someone supports (Curtice and Heath, 2000). But in Scotland
those who feel Scottish are, in particular, more likely to support the SNP and, to
a lesser extent, Labour, while the minority who feel British still give significant 
support to the Conservatives (Brown et al., 1999; Paterson et al., 2001).
Meanwhile the SNP is not just a nationalist party in favour of independence, but
is also nowadays a left of centre ‘social democratic’ party and, as we have 
already noted, pro-European. This helps explain why Scottishness has not just
become associated with support for independence but also with more left-wing 
values, while at the same time has avoided acquiring a particularly exclusive
character.
Second, people in Scotland also appear to draw a sharper distinction between 
what it means to be Scottish and what it means to be British than people in
England do between being English and being British. This is revealed by the
results to a  number of questions designed to measure people’s national 
sentiment, first for England/Scotland and then for Britain as a whole (Heath et 
al., 1999). For example, we asked people, first whether they thought “People in
England/Scotland are too ready to criticise their country”, and then whether they
thought “People in Britain are too ready to criticise their country”. In each case 
they could respond on a scale ranging from “agree strongly” to “disagree
strongly”. If people tend to give similar answers to the two questions, this 
suggests  they  draw  little  distinction  between  what  it   means  to  be
English/Scottish and what it means to be British. If on the other hand they tend
to give different answers, then they would appear to draw a clear distinction.
The next table shows the correlation between the answers given by people in 
England and those in Scotland to three similarly or identically worded questions
about  English/Scottish national sentiment and British national sentiment. In
each case we can see that although there is a positive correlation in Scotland, it
is weaker than in England. Thus, for example, there is a correlation of 0.65
between  people’s views about whether people in England are too ready to
criticise their country and whether people in Britain are too ready to criticise 
their country. The equivalent correlation in Scotland in contrast is just 0.39.
Although people in Scotland do not have entirely different views about
Scotland and about Britain, they do draw more of a distinction than do people in
England between England and Britain. And, if people in England can see little 
difference between England and Britain, we should not be surprised that
whether they feel English or whether they feel British makes little difference to
their social and political attitudes.
Table 11 Relationship between views about England/Scotland and Britain, in
England and Scotland
Correlation* between attitudes when
nation = England/Scotland and nation = Britain
England Scotland
People in (nation) are too ready to criticise their country
0.65 0.39
Base 1890 1635
There are some things about (nation) that make me
ashamed 0.59 0.29
Base 1898 1642
(Nation) has a lot to learn from (other countries/ rest of




These are early days for devolution. But our analysis suggests that, so far at 
least,  both the hopes and the fears that have been expressed about the
implications of devolution for the United Kingdom may well have been
exaggerated. Devolution has  not  led to an increase in support for Scottish
independence; nor does there appear to be much potential for conflict between
the peoples of England and Scotland over how the relationship between the two
countries should be managed, let alone signs of an ‘English backlash’. While
there was a decline in Britishness both north and south of the border between
1997 and 1999, our latest reading does not provide any consistent evidence of a 
further movement in that direction. In any event, in England at least, national
identity does not appear to have much influence on people’s views on the future
of the Union or indeed many other topics.
At the same time, the Scottish Parliament has yet to make much impact on 
people’s perceptions of how they are governed. Indeed, many people in
Scotland appear to feel that Westminster still has rather more influence north of
the border than they had anticipated, and as a result they are hoping for a more
powerful Scottish Parliament than they have seen so far. And while national 
identity may not currently make much difference to people’s views in England, 
and while people in England may indeed still have difficulty in distinguishing 
between England and Britain, we cannot rule out the possibility that England’s 
politicians will eventually succeed in politicising people’s sense of national
identity, much as it already is in Scotland. Devolution appears to have set sail 
on a fair wind so far as public opinion is concerned. But whether it is eventually
judged a success depends on the skills and actions of the politicians who have
been entrusted by the public with the task of making it work.
Notes
1. We might also note that while the proportion of people in Scotland who think that 
there is very or fairly serious conflict between the Scottish and the English did fall 
slightly from 43 per cent to 38 per cent between 1999 and 2000, the level still 
remains above the 30 per cent level in 1992 just after the Conservatives’ fourth 
election victory, let alone the 15 per cent level in 1979 just after the first attempt to 
implement devolution failed.
2. In the 1997, 1999 and 2000 surveys, respondents were first invited to state all of the 
identities that described how they thought of themselves and then asked which 
single one best described themselves. In the 1979 and 1992 survey, respondents 
were only invited to name one identity. Respondents were also offered a slightly 
shorter list of identities in 1992, except that in 1979 the option ‘British and Scottish’ 
was offered. However, as the results in 1992 and 1997 are largely similar in each 
country, it appears unlikely that these methodological differences compromise our 
substantive conclusions.
3. The 1997  figure in Table 10.7 is from the British/Scottish Election Studies 
conducted in the late spring and summer of 1997 before the Scottish and Welsh 
referendums were held. That the Scottish referendum gave a boost to feeling a 
Scottish rather than a British identity amongst people in Scotland is further attested 
by the fact that on our forced choice measure no less than 83 per cent of respondents 
to the Scottish Referendum Study, conducted in the autumn of 1997, said that they 
were Scottish and just 13 per cent that they were British.
4. Because of the small numbers of people in Scotland who are either mostly or wholly
British rather than Scottish we have combined these two categories (labelling them
‘predominantly British’). To keep our analysis symmetrical, we have done the same 
among those who feel mostly or wholly English or Scottish.
5. It is, however, the case that the association between national identity and attitudes 
towards Europe, found by Curtice and Heath (2000) in 1999, is rather weaker in the
2000 survey.
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